“Buy-back” in international trade: A rationale

Conclusion When a technology proprietor cannot exploit his advantage by means of ownership of a production facility abroad, a sales contract with “buy-back provisions” may, in fact, be a trade-enhancing resolution to a situation of information-asymmetry between buyer and seller. The important implication is that not all forms of countertrade can be summarily dismissed as inefficient. Just as foreign direct investment can be seen to be a response to environmental or market imperfections, “buy-back” may be a way to deal with institutional or regulatory obstacles such as the prohibition of foreign ownership.     

Robert Browne and Full Employment

Among the valuable contributions Robert Browne made in his career was the role he played in shaping the “Equal Opportunity and Full Employment Bill of 1974” that was introduced by Congressman Augustus Hawkins of California. Browne defined full employment as “a condition in which all persons willing and able to work, no matter what their race, gender, or national origin would be guaranteed a job”. In his view, if the private sector was unable to produce full employment, the government should act as the employer of last resort. Language in support of that view was included in the Hawkins bill. Robert Browne believed only a national policy to achieve that goal would eliminate racial disparities in employment and unemployment—a long term reality in the American labor market. The 1974 Hawkins bill was met with only tepid Congressional support, little notice from civil rights leaders, and no response from the business community. Little was done to advance full employment legislation until Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota embraced the cause in 1975. Negotiations with Congressman Hawkins led to the development of the “Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1975,” a legislative measure to replace the Employment Act of 1946. The new bill was commonly known as the Humphrey–Hawkins Full Employment Bill. Robert Browne offered far less support for the new bill than for the original full employment bill introduced by Mr. Hawkins. The Humphrey Hawkins Bill failed to provide explicitly a job guarantee for all workers, and included an inflation target to make price stability co-equal with full employment as a national policy objective. The Humphrey–Hawkins Bill was enacted into law in 1978, and remains the nation’s policy dictum on full employment to this day.     

Determining the economic gains from regulation at the extensive and intensive margins

Among the second-best approaches for the regulation of pollution,little attention has been paid to the distorting effect of intensivemargin policies on the extensive margin. This article shows,within a dynamic framework, that regulation of the intensivemargin has to be complemented by regulation of the extensivemargin. Depending on the elasticity of the pollution functionwith respect to nitrogen use, the appropriate regulation atthe extensive margin is zero, a tax or a subsidy. We show empiricallythat combining a nitrogen tax with land-use taxes is about 18per cent more cost efficient than a nitrogen tax alone and 58per cent more efficient than off-site abatement in the formof groundwater treatment.     

Multiunit Pay‐Your‐Bid Auction with One‐Dimensional Multiunit Demands*

An arbitrary number of units of a good is sold to two bidders through a discriminatory auction. The bidders are homogeneous ex ante and their demand functions are two‐step functions that depend on a single parameter. We characterize the symmetric Bayesian equilibrium and prove its existence and uniqueness. We compare this equilibrium with the equilibrium of the multiunit Vickrey auction and with the equilibria of the single‐unit first price and second price auctions. We examine the consequences of bundling all units into one package. We study the impacts that variations of the “relative” supply have on the equilibrium, on the bidders' average payoffs per unit, and on the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation.     

LA DÉLÉGATION DES SERVICES PUBLICS AUX ASSOCIATIONS PAR LES COLLECTIVITÉS LOCALES:

RÉSUMÉ ** : Dans le cadre communal français, des biens collectifs locaux sont offerts simultanement par les municipalités et par les associations. Toutefois, l'offre publique ne signifie pas toujours la production publique. Les municipalités peuvent ainsi déléguer la gestion de services collectifs locaux à des entreprises privées ou à des associations. La plupart du temps, les communes se contenteront de subventionner laproduction associative.
Aprés avoir précisé la distinction entre fourniture et production de biens, et le cadre légal et administratif particulier dans lequel s'inscrit la fourniture publique communale des biens et services collectifs locaux, nous soulignons les causes et les formes dupartenariat entre secteur public communal et associations, et les catégories d'actions associatives répondant aux attentes des municipalités.     

Credit Constraints in Manufacturing Enterprises in Africa

We investigate the question of whether firms in Africa's manufacturingsector are credit constrained. The fact that few firms obtaincredit is not sufficient to prove constraints, since certainfirms may not have a demand for credit while others may be refusedcredit as part of profit maximising behaviour by banks. To investigatethis question, we use direct evidence on whether firms had ademand of credit and whether their demand was satisfied in theformal credit market, based on panel data on firms in the manufacturingsector from six African countries. Of those firms with a demandfor credit, only a quarter obtained a formal sector loan. Ouranalysis suggests that while banks allocate credit on the basisof expected profits, micro or small firms are much less likelyto get a loan than large firms. We also find that outstandingdebt is positively related with obtaining further lending. Therole of outstanding debt is likely to be a reflection of inefficiencyin credit markets, while the fact that size matters is consistentwith a bias as well, although we cannot totally exclude thatthey reflect transactions costs on the part of banks. We presentan analysis showing how much more profitable small firms mustbe to obtain a loan than large firms.